Download e-book for iPad: Akrasia in Greek Philosophy (Philosophia Antiqua) by Destrée, P. (ed.), Bobonich, Ch. (ed.), Christopher

By Destrée, P. (ed.), Bobonich, Ch. (ed.), Christopher Bobonich, Pierre Destree

ISBN-10: 9004156704

ISBN-13: 9789004156708

The thirteen contributions of this collective provide new and difficult methods of examining recognized and extra ignored texts on akrasia (lack of keep watch over, or weak point of will) in Greek philosophy (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Plotinus).

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Extra info for Akrasia in Greek Philosophy (Philosophia Antiqua)

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2 thomas c. brickhouse and nicholas d. smith whenever the metrêtikê technê is present in someone he will not be defeated by the dunamis tou phainomenou. What is not clear in the Protagoras discussion is just why some things have the power of appearance at all. ’ In this paper we shall try to clarify both issues and in so doing criticize two different ways of understanding Socrates’ moral psychology. We shall argue, contrary to what is usually said, that, for Socrates, ‘the power of appearance’ is tied to the psychological agency of the appetites and passions.

One important piece of evidence that Devereux cites in favor of his interpretation is the passage in the Laches we looked at above. ’ More evidence, Devereux contends, comes from Socrates’ exhortation to Callicles in the Gorgias to pursue a life of self-control. There Socrates says: ‘. . for it’s not like a self-controlled person to avoid and pursue what isn’t appropriate, but to avoid and pursue what he should, whether these are things to do or people, or pleasure and pains, and to stand fast and to endure where he should’ (507b5–8).

15 Hunger, in this view, is a pang one feels when one’s stomach is empty; fear is an uncomfortable twinge one experiences when one believes that one is in danger; and so forth. Now because these internal events are pleasures and pains, they appear good and evil, respectively, to an agent, which, according to the traditional account of Socratic intellectualism, implies we always have, antecedent to their occurrence, a rational desire to pursue the former and to avoid the later. What the traditionalist must insist upon, however, is that such inner events, which is what Socrates is in the Charmides calling epithumiai, themselves have no causal powers whatsoever.

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Akrasia in Greek Philosophy (Philosophia Antiqua) by Destrée, P. (ed.), Bobonich, Ch. (ed.), Christopher Bobonich, Pierre Destree

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